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1. INTRODUCTION 
1 ' .  
The Saturn/Apollo Systems Office a t  t h e  George C. Marshall  
Space F l i g h t  Center (MSFC) requested ARINC Research Corporation 
t o  make a b r i e f  study of t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  a spec t s  of t h e  All-Up 
concept. Under t h e  requirements of Task 294-02 of Contract 
NAS8-11087, t h e  study included a comparison between t h e  r e l i -  
a b i l i t y  of t h e  f irst  Saturn V veh ic l e  i f  All-Up, and i t s  
r e l i a b i l i t y  w i t h  dummy upper s tages .  
The A l l - U p  concept may be descr ibed as  the concept of 
canductlng the  Saturn V R&D launch-vehicle program without 
the use of dummy s tages .  
s tage ,  all Saturn V launches s t a r t i n g  w i t h  SA-501 would 
a l s o  have a l i v e  S-I1 second s tage ,  a l i v e  S-IVB t h i r d  stage, 
l i v e  i n t e r s t a g e s ,  a complete Instrument Unit ,  and a l i v e  
( b u t  unmanned) Apollo capsule. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  having a l i v e  S-IC 
This  s tudy was undertaken a s  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of 
the e f f e c t  of t h e  A l l - U p  concept on the success  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o r  t he  i n i t i a l  Sa turn  V f l i g h t s .  It cons i s t ed  p r imar i ly  o f  
completing a prel iminary r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  the 
Sa tu rn  V s t a g e s  and reviewing da ta  from previous launches. 
T h i s  r e p o r t  p re sen t s  t h e  r e s u l t s  of the  r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n  
and u n c l a s s i f i e d  r e s u l t s  from the s tudy  of previous launches.* 
Related c l a s s i f i e d  r e s u l t s  from the s tudy o f  previous 
launches w i l l  be given i n  o r a l  p re sen ta t ions .  
I n  t h e  course o f  t he  study, s eve ra l  approaches t o  imple- 
T h i s  r e p o r t  mentation of t h e  A l l - U p  concept were considered. 
d i s c u s s e s  these  approaches, and p resen t s  two recommendations 
f o r  iniplementation. 
I 
JC With the  exceptlon of the a d d i t i o n a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d l c t i o n  
ViOUSly submitted letter r e p o r t  (dated 25 March 1964). 
x.,, CL 0 - L - - - ^  ~- i u ~ -  a a b u L - i l  V stages, this ~ 7 e p o i ~ t  is ideiicical t0.a pi'e- 
. .. 
2 -  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
2.1 Conclusions 
During the course of t h i s  r e l i a b i l i t y  study, three 
(1) The p r e d i c i d  r e l i a b i l i t y  for an A l l - U p  SA-501 
c ux-dependent conclusions were reached: 
Saturn V veh ic l e  was 0.497 d t h  no engine-out 
capabi l i ty*,  and 0.682 wi th  one-engine-out capa- 
b i l i t y .  
with only a l i v e  S-IC stage and a l i v e  Instrument 
Unit were 0.921 with no engine-out capabilLty,  and 
0.932 w i t h  one-engine-out c a p a b i l i t y .  
The p red ic t ions  f o r  the SA-501 v e h i c l e  
( 2 )  One-engine-out c a p a b i l i t y  would e f f e c t  a s i g n i f i -  
cant  i nc rease  i n  the r e l i a b i l i t y  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  
conf igura t ions  o f  the  SA-501 veh ic l e .  
ved from the  A l l - U p  concept 
ed t o  any one of v a r i o u s  
nc lus ions  1 and 2 do n o t  
of Implementation f o r  i n i t i a l  f l i g h t s .  
t h i s  dec i s ion  must be based on a study of the 
pmbable  amount o f  t e s t  i n fo rma t ion  t o  be obtained,  
the probable lauiich date ,  and the  p r o b a b l e  s t a t u s  
of the  ind iv idua l  systems. 
f o r  dec id ing  the  optimum degree 
Rather, 
* See pages 9-12 for* a desci9.ption of' t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y .  
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2.2 Recommendations 
On the basis of the above conclusions, two recommendations 
are made for implementation of the All-Up concept: 
(1) Incorporate dne-engine-out capability on the S-IC 
and S-I1 stages for initial Saturn V flights, 
and plan the flights to be compatible with thrust 
produced f rom only f o u r  engines in each stage. 
( 2 )  Develop a continuing surveillance program to deter- 
mine, periodically, the optimum configuration for 
each Saturn V flight. This determination should 
be based on: the probable amount of test informa- 
tion expected from each system, the prcbable launch 
date. (considering prelaunch- and checkout-time 
requirements), and the availability and probable 
status of the individual systems. 
3 
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3.1 The All-Up Concept 
The All-Up concept may be simply described as the 
concept of conducting %he Saturn V R&D launch-vehicle pro- 
gram without the use of dummy stages. In addition to having 
a live S-IC stage, all Saturn V launches starting with SA-501 
xould a l s o  have a l j v e  S-I1 second stage, a live S-IVB third 
stage, live interstages, a complete Instrument Unit, and a 
live (but unmanned) Apollo capsule. 
* This concept has considerable merit because it provides 
for the earliest possible flight-testing of all the systems 
of the Apollo mission in their flight configuration and 
environment. Early flight-testing has two advantages: 
(1) Successful checkout of hardware would bring the 
achievement of a successful Apollo mission much 
nearer in time. 
( 2 )  The discovery of major flaws in the design would 
allow the longest possible time f o r  correction. 
However, these two advantages are accompanied by two possible 
disadvantages : 
(1) The difficulties involved in concurrently preparing 
several new systems f o r  launch may significantly 
delay the SA-501 schedule, thus causing delay even 
f o r  those systems actually test-ready on schedule. 
A malfunction in one of the systems may abort a 
portion o r  all of the flight, thereby defeating 
the objectives of the All-Up concept. 
( 2 )  
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Thus, because of t h i s  balance of advantages and disadvantages,  
t he  procedure used t o  decide whether or not t o  implement t h e  
A l l - U p  concept i s  a c l a s s i c a l  example of t r ade -o f f s .  
The major e f f o r t  i n  t h i s  study was d i r e c t e d  a t  evalu- 
a t i n g  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence of the second disadvan- 
tage,  i . e . ,  occurrence o f  a malfunction t h a t  could cause 
ca t a s t roph ic  l o s s  o f  an e n t i r e  mission. A R I N C  Research u t i ?  
l i z e d  two approaches in  applying da ta  f rom previous experience.  
The f irst  approach was to compare t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n  
f o r  an A l l - U p  conf igura t ion  wi th  tne p r e d i c t i c n s  for each o f  
s eve ra l  p a r t i a l l y  up conf igura t ions  (S-IC and dummies). The 
second approach was t o  study t h e  f l i g h t  records  f o r  previous 
18unches , to  determine any s i g n i f i c a n t  t r e n d s  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  
growth (des ign  ma tu r i ty )  and d i f f e r e n c e s  between the r e l i -  
a b i l i t i e s  o f  s i n g l e  and mult i -s tage launches. The fol lowing 
s e c t i o n s  w i l l  d i s cuss  the two approaches and t h e  r e s u l t s  they 
produced. 
' 
3.2 R e l i a b i l i t y  Predic t ion  
A prel iminary p red ic t ion  or' t h e  Saturn V veh ic l e  has  
j u s t  been completed by ARINC Research under a s epa ra t e  t a s k  
and i s  being prepared a s  Special  Technical Report No. 16. 
Table 1 p r e s e n t s  a summary o f  the p r e d i c t i o n s  f o r  the 
Sa tu rn  V s t ages .  
o f  a mature design.  
These values a r e  based on the assumption 
3.3 Design Maturity 
The degree o f  i n i t i a l  design matur i ty  i s  a func t ion  of 
s e v e r a l  design f a c t o r s .  Among the  more important ones a r e :  
(1) t h e  f l i g h t  experience of the design and of s i m i l a r  
designs,  ( 2 )  t h e  p r i o r  experience of the design group, 
( 3 )  t h e  q u a l i t y  of t he  r e l i a b i l i t y  program, and ( 4 )  the 
advances i n  t h e  s t a t e  of t he  a r t  requi red  by t h e  design 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  
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TABLE l 
PRELIMINARY RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS FOR SATURN V 
STAGES AND VARIOUS LIVE-STAGE SA-501 CONFIGURATIONS 
Predicted R e l i a b i l i t y  
Stage o r  Configuration 
Stage 
s-IC 
s-I1 
s-IVB 
Instrument Unit 
Configurat ion 
s-IC, I U  
s-IC, s-11, IU 
+ S - I C ,  s-11, s-IVB, IU 
s-IC, s-IVB, I U  
Ns Zfigine-Out 
Capab i l i t y  
0 -  977 
0.800 
0.899 
0.957 
0.935 
0.748 
0.672 
0.841 
One -Engine-Out 
Capabi l i ty* 
(s-IC, s-11) 
0 943 
0 855 
0.769 
0.847 
* Values based on assumed mature design. 
6 
The S-I stage is an example of early design maturity. 
Much of the detailed design is derived f rom earlier rockets, 
particularly Redstone and Jupiter. The design group is well 
experienced, and the reliability program, although informal, 
is comprehensive. The most significant advance in the state 
of the art is represented by the cluster technique. 
The S-IV stage is considered t o  be lower in design 
maturity than the S-I stage. Some of the reasons f o r  this 
are: the unusual nature of the dual cryogenic propulsion 
system (in spite of  the advanced state o f  development of the 
RL-10 engines); the rudimentary nature of the S-IV relia- 
bility program; and the various problems encountered t o  tiate 
inathe S-IV development program. Although the first S-IV 
stage flight was a success, it was immediately preceded by 
a catastrophic explosion of the All Systems Test Vehicle, 
which was caused by a valve malfunction. Other major failures 
may well occur before the development or "debugging" process 
is completed. 
The predicted reliabilities in Table 1 were calculated by 
using historical data from designs that had reached maturity. 
Early design problems were corrected, and the systems were 
thorough1y'hebugged"before the data were compiled. 
f o r  the inltial flights of the Saturn V, the stages cannot be 
expected to'ria'cre reached a high level of design maturity. 
Failtires can be expected to result from design flaws that remain 
undetected because o f :  inability to duplicate the environments, 
test proced-wes t h a t  do not include a l l  contingencies, or' 
unanticipated interactions between components and systems. In 
an attempt to compensate f o r  the design immaturity of the 
Saturn V stages f o r  the initial launches, A R I N C  Research assigned 
a design maturity value f o r  each stage. These values are based 
on the characteristics listed in Table 2, and are used for the 
purpose of modifying the prediction values to make them more 
nearly representative of t h e  initial launches. 
However, 
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3.4 Adjusted Prediction 
Using the design maturity values from Table 2, the 
reliabilities f rom Table 1 were recalculated f o r  each stage 
and for each possible vehicle configuration.* The adjusted 
reliabilities shown in Table 3 represent the probability of 
success for initial flights. For successive flights, the 
probability of success can be expected to increase as a result 
of an increase in design maturity, brought about by failure 
analyses and corrective actions on failures experienced on 
early flights. 
Inspection of Table 3 shows that the reliability of a 
configuration consisting of the S-IC and Instrument Unit is 
0.932 with one-engine-out capability, and 0.682 f o r  a com- 
plete live SA-501 with one-engine-out capability. 
way of comparing the reliabilities in Table 3 is to normalize 
the reliability for each configuration by using an arbitrary 
standard. Figure 1 shows the reliability for each configura- 
tion as compared to the reliability of the complete SA-501 
vehicle with one-engine-out capability. 
A useful 
3.5 Engine-Out Capability 
Figure 1 shows that the reliability for each configura- 
t l G r r  is higher when one-engine-out capability is incorporated. 
This difference is most significant in configurations that 
use the S-I1 stage. 
One-engine-out capability must include: 
(ij Capability to sense t h a t  an eiigine has malfunc- 
tioned. 
( 2 )  Capability to cut off a malfunctioning engine 
before it damages other engines o r  critical 
portions of the stage. 
* Appendix A explains the method of applying design maturlty 
values .  
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TABLE 3 I 
RELIABILITY PREDICTIONS FOR INITIAL FLIGHTS OF SATURN V 
CORRECTED BY ASSIGNED VALUES OF DESIGN MATURITY 
STAGES AND VARIOUS LIVE-STAGE SA-501 CONFIGURATIONS 
Stage o r  Configuration 
Stage '  
s-IC 
s-I1 
s-IVB 
I U  
Configurat ion 
s - I C ,  IU 
s-IC, s-11, IU 
S-IC, S-11, S-IVB, I U  
S-IC, S-IVB, I U  
I 
 
Predicted R e l i a b i l i t y  
No Engine-Out 
Capab i l i t y  
0.967 
0.600 
0 899 
0.952 
0.921 
0 552 
0.497 
0.828 
One -Engine- Out 
Capabi 1 i t y  
(s-IC, s-11) 
0.979 
0.814 
0 899 
0.952 
0 932 
0.759 
0 . 682* 
0.838 
* Value used f o r  normalizing t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  shown in 
Figure 1.' I 
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No Engine-Out 
Capabi l i ty  
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IU 
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s-IC 
s-I1 
IU 
One -Engine-Out 
Capabi l i ty  
1.000 
s-IC 
s-I1 
s - I C  
-s-IVB 
s-IVB IU 
IU 
Conf igura t ions  
FIGURE 1 
COMPARISON BETWEEN PREDICTED RELIABILITY 
FOR SA-501 SATURN v CONFIGURATIONS WITH 
AND WITHOUT ENGINE-OUT CAPABILITY 
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( 3 )  Capab i l i t y  t o  a t t a i n  an acceptab le  f l i g h t  p r o f i l e  
w i th  the t h r u s t  from n-1 engines  ( n  = number of 
engines on s t a g e ) .  
At the time of t h e  f i r s t  Saturn V f l i g h t ,  the F-1 and 
J-2 engines w i l l  have completed less t e s t i n g  than was accom- 
p l i s h e d  on the H-1  or RL-10 engines before  t he i r  i n i t i a l  
f l i g h t s .  The p r i n c i p a l  reason f o r  the lower l e v e l  of t e s t ing  
i s  the c o s t s  of the voluminous p rope l l an t  requirements f o r  
each tes t  with the l a r g e r  engines.  Addit ional  development 
testi i ig tjould be va luable  f o r  the purpose of achieving higher 
engine r e l i a b i l i t y  i f  t hese  c o s t s  were not  p r o h i b i t i v e .  
Engine-out c a p a b i l i t y  provides  a means of c b t a i n i n g  a 
considerable  inc rease  i n  propuls ion system r e l i a b i l i t y  for 
e a r l y  R&D flights. Since the  purpose of t he  e a r l y  Sa turn  V 
f l i g h t s  i s  t o  o b t a i n  f l i g h t  t e s t  information r a t h e r  than  t o  
p lace  a s p e c i f i c  payload i n  o r b i t ,  i t  i s  reconmended t h a t  
one-engine-out c a p a b i l i t y  be included i.n the S-IC and S- I1  
s t ages .  To be e f f e c t i v e ,  t h i s  recommendation would a l s o  
r e q u i r e  t h a t  t he  f l i g h t  plan f o r  t he  SA-501 sho t s  and o t h e r  
e a r l y  Saturn V s h o t s  be designed f o r  a s a f e  and u s e f u l  f l i g h t  
i n  the event of p a r t i a l  l o s s  of t h r u s t  i n  e i the r  s t age .  
For e a r l y  f l i g h t s ,  i t  may be advantageous t o  i n c r e a s e  
the number of malfunction sensors  over the number presently 
planned f o r  t h e  emergency d e t e c t i o n  system. 
senso r s  would provide an  e a r l y  warning system t o  d e t e c t  
malfunct ions before  they cumulatively r e s u l t  i n  c a t a s t r o p h i c  
f a i l u r e  condi t ions .  
These extra 
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3.6 Past H i s to ry  
A survey was conducted of  success - f a i lu re  da t a  from 
previous launches. The f i rs t  ob jec t ive  o f  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
was t o  determine i f  p a s t  experience would indicate a signifi- 
can t  d i f f e rence  between the  l aunch- f l igh t  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a 
s i n g l e  s t a g e  and t h a t  of mul t ip le  s t ages .  The second objec- 
t i v e  was t o  determine any e x i s t i n g  r e l i a b i l i t y  growth t rends .  
Some d a t a  were a v a i l a b l e  from the V i t r o  s tudy  descr ibed 
i n  MSFC document MTP-MS-IS-61-4, Missile and Space P ro jec t  
Information Manual, which is c l a s s i f i e d  SECRET. T h i s  document 
p re sen t s  launch da ta  f o r  a l l  f i r i n g s  through December 1961. 
Data were a l s o  obtained from the  Report t o  Congress from the  
Pres ident  of the United S t a t e s  on U. S. Aeronautics and Space 
A c t i v i t i e s  i n  1963 ( u n c l a s s i f i e d ) .  
here was drawn from t h e  unclassified document. Conclusions 
based on the c l a s s i f i e d  r epor t  w i l l  be given i n  o r a l  p resenta-  
t i o n s ,  
The material presented  
The d a t a  from the  Repor t  t o  Congress a r e  p l o t t e d  i n  
F igure  2. 
c l a s s i f i e d  a s  successful* from 1957 through 1963. The 
success  percentage rose  s t e a d i l y  each yea r  and has  remained 
n e a r l y  cons tan t  (between 80% and 85%) f o r  1962 and 1963. 
This  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  may be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  a n  i n c r e a s e  
in des ign"matur i ty ,  improvement i n  t he  state of the a r t  (such 
a s  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  of  the J u p i t e r  engine i n t o  the H-l), and 
The b a r s  show the  percentage of yea r ly  launches 
r e f i n e d  prelaunch test-and-checkout procedures.  
* A launch was c l a s s i f i e d  as  a success  provided e a r t h  o r b i t ,  
a s  a minimum, was a t t a ined .  The percentage shown i s  equal  
t o  number of successes  d iv ided  by number of a t t empt s  x 100. 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALL-UP CONCEPT 
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4.1 General 
Although a dec i s ion  must be made i n  the nea r  f u t u r e  
concerning implementation of the A l l - U p  concept, 
s i o n  a s  t o  the  degree of implementation should be postponed. 
There a r e  advantages t o  be gained by implementing the A l l - U p  
comep t  i n  any of s eve ra l  degrees, and a complete range of 
systems t h a t  can be included o r  omitted from the SA-501 
l aunch- f l igh t  t es t  shot .  The a c t u a l  dec i s ion  t o  inc lude  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  system should be made a s  l a t e  a s  p o s s i b l e  and 
should be based on: 
the dec i -  
(1) 
( 2 )  
(3 )  
Amount o f  t e s t  information expected from the  system. 
Estimated a v a i l a b i l i t y  d a t e  of t he  system. 
Est imates  o f  time r equ i r ed  f o r  prelaunch tes t -and= 
checkout a c t i v i t i e s .  
4.2 Test  Information 
Each of the var ious  poss ib l e  conf igura t ions  of  the SA-501 
w i l l  produce a s p e c i f i c , i n d i v i d u a l  s e t  o f  tes t  information. 
The p r o b a b i l i t y  of  ob ta in ing  some o r  a l l  of each s e t  of  tes t  
informat ion  is, of course, a func t ion  of  the p r o b a b i l i t y  of 
success  of one o r  more of the l i v e  systems i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
conf igura t ion .  T h i s  l a t t e r  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  p red ic t ab le ,  and 
t h e  accuracy of  such a p r e d i c t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  as  the launch 
date approaches. 
4.3 System A v a i l a b i l i t y  
The most important a r eas  of  cons ide ra t ion  i n  determining 
the  conf igura t ion  f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  SA-501 f l i g h t  are the es t i -  
mates o f  s t age  and subsystem a v a i l a b i l i t y  and the p red ic t ed  
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p r o b a b i l i t y  of  mission success. 
es t imates  w i l l  be f a c i l i t a t e d  by monitoring the p rogres s  of 
each s t a g e  assembly very c lose ly  and by keeping a running 
assessment of t h e  test ,program. 
es t imates  may be compiled of s t a g e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  d a t e s  and 
the p r o b a b i l i t y  of s a t i s f a c t o r y  performance. 
Prepara t ion  of these 
From lsuch e f f o r t a ,  good 
PERT c h a r t s  f o r  each s t age  w i l l  be u s e f u l  f o r  monitoring 
t h e  progress  i n  assembling s tages .  For each programmed 
launch da te ,  the c h a r t s  should inc lude  as  a milestone the  
l a t e s t  poss ib l e  time f o r  ordei-ing an a l t e r n a t e  o r  dummy 
system. 
information and making appropr ia te  dec i s ions .  
monitoring programs t h a t  use PERT, the p r e c i s i o n  of the time 
es t ima tes  w i l l  i nc rease  wi th  proximity t o  the  milestones.  
T h i s  t i m e  i s  based on time requi red  f o r  c o l l e c t i n g  
A s  wi th  a l l  
It i s  expected t h a t  the S- I1  s t a g e  w i l l  be t h e  major 
The S-IC stage w i l l  be used whether o r  
The S-IVB w i l l  have a l r eady  
pacing i t e m  i n  implementing the A l l - U p  concept f o r  the 
Sa turn  V vehic le .  
no t  t he  veh ic l e  i s  a l l  l i v e .  
flown seve ra l  f l i g h t s  i n  the  Sa tu rn  I B  vehic le ,  and the 
Instrument Unit i s  expected t o  be a v a i l a b l e  s i n c e  i t  i s  very 
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  one i n  the  Saturn IB. 
: -7 
.. 
These cons ide ra t ions  are f u r t h e r  emphasized by t h e  fac- 
tors l i s t e d  i n  Table 2 regarding design maturity. Because 
t h e  S-I1 stage i s  a completely new design and t h e  first of 
i t s  kind t o  be b u i l t  by t h e  supp l i e r ,  t h e  development progress  
w i l l  r e q u i r e  c l o s e  monitoring f 'or schedule conpliance and t o  
ensure attainment of r e l i a b i l i t y  goals .  
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It must be pointed out; that the design maturity factors 
and schedule considerations do not present the complete 
picture. The S-I1 contractor has demonstrated considerable 
management capability in the development of complex systems 
in the past. Application of these same capabilities to the 
S-I1 stage could result in circumstances more auspicious 
than presently anticipated. 
4.4 Prelaunch Test and Checkout 
The probability of launch occurrence at a given point 
in time for the vai-ious possible SA-501 configurations can 
be predicted. 
prelaunch activities are functions of the occurrence and 
detection of malfunctions that require corrective action and 
of the time required t o  accomplish such action. An analysis 
of past experience relating such delays t o  system complexity, 
design maturity, and competence of personnel can be expected 
t o  yield estimates of delays that are sufficiently accurate 
for use in choosing the optimum configuration. As the launch 
date approaches, more applicable experience will accumulate, 
and,correspondingly, the accuracy of the delay estimates w i l l  
improve. 
The occurrence and duration of delays in the 
The complexity of the configuratlon ard the number of 
live systems on a launch vehicle directly affect the time 
required t o  complete prelaunch test-and-checkout activities. 
Since an All-Up SA-501 would be the largest vehicle ever 
launched, extensive time delays in completing the prelaunch 
test and checkout can be expected. 
previously, these delays can be anticipated and estimated. 
The level of competent effort required for checkout activity 
on SA-501 should be a natural extension of the capability 
However, as discussed 
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a l ready  demonstrated a t  Kennedy Space Center. 
Saturn IB veh ic l e  wi th  manned Gemini f l i g h t s  i s  expected t o  
a i d  i n  extending the prelaunch-and-checkout c a p a b i l i t y  a t  
Kennedy Space Center t o  the necessary l e v e l .  
Launch of the 
4.5 Overall  Approach 
An extensive a n a l y s i s  of p a s t  experience and of informa- 
t i o n  on t h e  cu r ren t  development s t a t u s  seems t o  be t h e  b e s t  
method f o r  choosing an optimum SA-501 conf igura t ion ,  system 
by system, a t  t h e  e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  t i m e .  Furthermore, such 
an a n a l y s i s  should provide the g r e a t e s t  amount of a v a i l a b l e  
information a t  the e a r l i e s t  p r a c t i c a b l e  t i m e .  The advantage 
of a n  a n a l y s i s  of t h i s  kind is t h a t  i t  provides  management 
with v a l i d  deductions based on p a s t  experience and c u r r e n t  
s t a t u s .  
most needs them f o r  making dec i s ions  when they must be made. 
These deductions a r e  i n  the  form i n  which management 
It appears t h a t  the proper course t o  f o l l o w  i n  implemen- 
t a t i o n  of the A l l - U p  concept i s  t o  "hope f o r  the best  and 
prepare f o r  t h e  worst".  I n  o t h e r  words, t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  nec- 
e s sa ry  f o r  implementation should be c a r r i e d  ou t .  However, 
t he  p r e d i c t i o n s  and e s t ima tes  d iscussed  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  should 
be con t inua l ly  updated and c l o s e l y  monitored.by management. 
Through such ac t ion ,  appropr ia te  -p repa ra t ions  can be made 
- .  - _  
for s u b s t i t u t i n g  any dummy s t a g e s  requi red  by the f i n a l  
optimum conf igura t ion ,  
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APPLICATION OF DESIGN MATURITY VALUES 
,.... 
i : 
..-, 
I -" 
I .. 
1 -  
._.. 
T h i s  appendix b r i e f l y  desc r ibes  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
design matur i ty  values .  
p red ic t ed  r e l i a b i l i t i e s  based on mature design so  t h a t  the 
p r e d i c t i o n s  w i l l  r e f l e c t  the p r o b a b i l i t y  of success  f o r  
i n i t i a l  f l i g h t s .  
requi red  because t h e  p red ic t ions  a r e  based on d a t a  from 
previous systems t h a t  have been completely debugged i n s o f a r  
a s  both the hardware and the ope ra t iona l  procedures are 
concerned. 
These values  a r e  used t o  a d j u s t  
The use of des ign  ma tu r i ty  va lues  i s  
The design matur i ty  value may be appl ied t o  p red ic t ed  
Stage U n r e l i a b i l i t y  ( Q )  = 1 - Stage R e l i a b i l i t y  ( R ) ,  
r e l i a b i l i t y  I n  the following manner: 
o r  
Q = 1 - R .  (1) 
&p = ( D . M . ) ( Q ~ ) ,  (2) 
where 
= Predicted u n r e l i a b i l i t y ,  
= Assigned value of design matur i ty ,  (D.M. < l.O), (D.M. 
and 
7 
QA = Actual u n r e l i a b i l i t y .  
I 
Equation ( 2 )  may be r e w r i t t e n  a s :  
where 
= Predic ted  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  and RP 
... 
RA = Actual r e l i a b i l i t y .  
I ’  
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Design maturity operates on system unreliability. The 
operation takes into account the best estimate of the number 
of undetected potential failures in the vehicle at the time 
of launoh. Since t h e  design ma tu r i ty  i s  always equal to or 
less than unity, the predicted unreliability will be less 
than the actual unreliability; in other words, the predicted 
reliability is optimistic. 
maturity (D.M. ) will increase rapidly with successive launches. 
Inherent in this statement, however, is the assumption that 
m effective program of failure reporting, failure analysis, 
It can be expected that design 
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